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Introduction
Victor Gomez-Pin highlighted succincty one object of the second Congress on Ontology held
in San Sebastián and Barcelona in March of 1996 —by raising two questions due to Husserl
about Descartes, namely: is there a persistent value to Descarte's most basic ideas? And if
so, can they stimulete new, powerful ideas in our era? Indeed, one of the most interesting and
fundamental puzzles that Descartes was the first to face with any success is the nature of the
connections between mind and body, and the relevance of mathematics to both. It was
the physicist Eugene Wigner, however, who called it the "unreasonable" elfectiveness of
mathematics, by which he had in mind above all the powerful applications of mathematics to
physics, which have proven crucial for the advance of modem science.1 The Greeks showed
and early interest in these most basic questions of ontology and eplstemology, and from the an¬
swers given by such ligures as the Pythagoreans and Plato in antiquity, it is clear that
mathematics played a fundamental part in their analysis and understanding of nature. Two
millenia later, Galileo described his own similar point of view as follows:
[The book ofNature] is written in the language ofmathematics, and its characters are triangles, circles
and other geometric figures without which it is humanly impossible to undestand a single word of it;
without these, one wanders about in a dark labyrinth.2
Nature is mathematical, or may be explored and understood mathematically, because math¬
ematics is the language of nature. But if so, this immediately suggests another question: where
does the language come from? Galileo believed that the world was created using mathematics
—and as far back as the Greeks, it was assumed that the universe was constructed according
to the ratios and proportions of geometry, that all of nature proceeds therefore according to
number, weight and measure:
Nonetheless, the approach taken here in exploring the question ofwhy mathematics should be so elfec-
tive in the exploration of nature is somewhat dillerent from Galileo's. Going back to the title, "The
Unreasonable Elfectiveness of Mathematics: Cartesian Linguistics, the Mind-Body Problem and
Pragmatic Evolution," the mention of "Cartesian Linguistics" is a reference to ideas associated with the
linguist Noam Chomsky, the "Mind-Body Problem" recalls immediately the philosopher Descartes, and
"Pragmatic Evolution" is associated with the father of Prgamatism, Charles S. Peirce. Each of these, as
will become apparent, is specially relevant to the subject of this study devoted to ontology in general, but
to Descartes in particular—and above all, to the questions considered in the following, mamely questions
about mathematics and the reasons why it has proven so powerful in the study and explication of nature.
In what follows, attention will be devoted primarily to the American father of Prag¬
matism, Charles S. Peirce, to a brief history of neurological understanding of specific aspects
1 Wigner I960.
2 Galileo 1623, quoted from Drake 1957, p.238.
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of the mind-body problem, which may be traced back to many ideas pioneered by Descartes,
and to the claims of Cartesian linguistics championed by the linguist Noam Chomsky. In part,
much here will be sketched very broadly—to provide more historical context than detail, espe¬
cially where issues of bio-physics, chemistry and neuro-anatomy arise— much of which we
owe to the pioneering studies of the Spanish Nobel laureate Ramón y Cajal. But first, what does
any of this have to do with the American logician/philosopher, Charles S. Peirce?
Charles Peirce, abductive logic and the evolutionary history of the brain
One of the stories Charles Peirce liked to tell about himself involved the theft of a valuable gold
watch and his subsequent conjecture about the identity of the thief, a conjecture that turned out
to be something more than a lucky guess. Peirce delighted in recounting his dramatic hunt for
the stolen goods, and his great relief when they were ultimately recovered. The theft occurred
on a trip Peirce made to New York City aboard a coastal steamer, the Bristol, where an expen¬
sive Tiffany watch and fob, along with his coat, were taken from his stateroom.3 Peirce insist¬
ed on lining up the entire ship's crew in an effort to identify the culprit who had taken the
watch. As Pierce vividly described it:
I went from one end of the row to the other, and talked a little to each one, in as dégagé a manner as I
could, about whatever he could talk aboutwith interest, but would least expectme to bring forward, hoping
that I might seem such a fool that I should be able to detect some symptom of his being the thief. When 1
had gone through the row, I turned and walked from them, though not away, and said to myself, "Not
the least scintilla of light have I got to go upon". Dut thereupon my other self (for our own communings
are always in dialogues.) said to me, "But you simply must put your finger on the man. No matter ifyou
have no reason, you must say whom you will think to be the thief'. I made a little loop in my walk,
which had not taken a minute, and as 1 turned toward them, all shadow of doubt had vanished.4
Lather, Peirce described this incident in detail to his friend, the Harvard philosopher and
phychologist William James ( 1842-1910).5 He did so because he had come to regard the story
as an excellent example of what he called the logic of abduction. He also described this as the
"inclination to entertain an hypothesis", which served to explain "why it is that people so often
guess right". This in turn was intimately connected with Peirce's philosophy of science, for he
viewed abduction as the key to understanding the nature of scientific knowledge and how it is
obtained. Peirce described the formation of a hypothesis as "an act of insight", the "abductive
suggestion"coming tu us "like a flash".6 There was another principle at work as well, one re-
3 The version presented here is derived from Peirce's own manuscript account, "Guessing", Houghton MS
CSP 687. This manuscript actually contains two different versions of the story, separately paginated, the earlier in
a clearer hand, the other (presumably later) in a less steady hand, but with more detail. The stoiy was first publish¬
ed (as his papers were being readied for publication) in a Harvard University magazine. The Hound and Horn,
Peirce 1929. It is also mentioned briefly in Peirce 1958, 7, 7.36-48. Recently, another account of the story was
given by Sebeok and Umiker-Sebeok 1979. This article has been reprinted in Sebeok 1981, pp. 17-21; and in Eco
and Sebeok 1983, pp.11-54. For a recent account of the story, see Dauben 1989 and 1996; note that Dauben 1996
actually represents a revised version of Dauben 1989; Dauben 1996 also contains a greater number of illustrations
than appear in Dauben 1989.
4 Houghton MS CSP 687, pp. 10-11 ; also in Peirce 1929, p. 271 ; quoted in Sebeok and Umiker-Sebeok 1979,
as printed in Eco and Sebeok 1983, pp. 11-12 (die transcription is not entirely accurate).
5 James encouraged Peirce to submit an account of this episode for publication in the Atlantic Monthly. He did
so, but the piece was rejected by Bliss Perry, the Monthly's editor. The story was not printed until it was given to The
HoundandHorn in 1929. See Sebeok and Umiker-Sebeok 1979. as printed in Eco and Sebeok 1983, p. 48, note 3.
6 Peirce 1931, vol.5,5.181, and Peirce 1958, vol. 7,7.39-40,7.46,7.218-219, and 7.679.
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fleeted in a maxim made famous by the fictional detective Sherlock Homes, who was always
guided by the "old axiom", as Peirce called it, "When all other contingencies fail, whatever
remains, however improbable, must be the truth."7
The point of this story about Peirce and the pragmatic reasons he gave for why we so
often "guess right", how it is all related to his theory of abduction, to mathematics, and to the
mind-body problem, will become clear aller we turn o what may at first seem an entirely dif¬
ferent subject — namely our understanding of the nature of thought, and the neuroanatomy of
the brain. The subject has a long and fascinating history of its own stretching from Aristotle to
Descartes and, in its modern development, to careful histological studies of Ramón y Cajal and
the more recent understanding of localization of cortex functions culminating in the research of
Wilder Penfield and his colleagues in Canada.
René Descartes and the human brain
René Descartes published the Latin version of his study of human anatomy and physiology. De
homine, in 1662, followed by a version in French in 1664.8 In working out a materialist bio¬
logy in considerable detail, Descartes explained his theory of brain function in clear, graphic,
mechanistic terms. To account for vision, for example, he explains that light from a material
object ABC enters the eye where visual images are projected onto the retina, which in turn is
connected to the brain via the optic nerve. Sensing pressure on the back of the eye, the brain
then relays this information to the pear-shaped pineal gland, where Descartes assumed the
image abc was formed in the mind as a direct result of this mechanical series of relays convey¬
ing the physical information from ABC to the mind's copy or mental image abc.
Having received the optical message transmitted by means ofwhat Descartes called "ani¬
mal spirits" to the pineal gland, this in turn initiates an appropriate réponse or motor stimulus.
Thus animal spirits from the brain are conveyed through a nerve to the arm muscle which then
inflates, producing the intended motion. Although Descarte's explanation is rather crude in its
way, the modem theory of reflex action may be said to begin with his primitive concept of
afferent and efferent components.9
Santiago Ramón y Cajal (1852-1934)
What Descartes was in no position to appreciate was the importance of the brain's micro-struc¬
ture, its neural anatomy, nor did he elaborate a sufficiently detailed theory of brain localization.
As for the brain's neuro-anatomy, Santiago Ramón y Cajal once described the nerve cell as
"The aristocrat among the structures of the body, with its giant arms stretched out like the ten¬
tacles of an octopus to the provinces on the outside word, to watch for the constant ambushes
of physical and chemical forces".10 It was Ramón y Cajal who discovered in 1871 that neurons
could be selectively stained with a special silver preparation. Although the method picks out
only one in a hundred cells, it monetheless stains the entire neuron body, along with all its proc¬
esses, thus setting it apart for easy examination.
7 This maxim is announced by Holmes in the course of a remarkable story involving stolen plans for the
Bnice-Partington submarine, top-secret at the turn of the century, which first appeared in Doyle 1908. It is repro¬
duced in Baring-Gould 1967, vol. 2, pp. 432-452. See esp. p. 446.
8 Descartes 1664, Fig. 53; reproduced in Clarke and Dewhust 1972, p.69, Fig. 93.
9 Clarke and O'Malley 1968, pp. 329-333.
10 Restak 1984, p.24.
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Each of the ten billion neurons in the human brain may have over a thousand synapses,
the points of contact between nerve cells. For some cells in the cerebral cortex, the numbers
may approach two hundred thousand such connections. Thus the total number of connections
within the vas extent of the human brain's neuronal system is truly astronomical —greater than
the number of physical particles in the known universe." Given such complexities of neural-
network structure, how can behavior or function be correlated with specific parts of the brain?
Cortical localization
Modern advances in the study of cortical localization have been made by numerous neurolo¬
gists, but perhaps no one has been more influential in this regard than Wilder Penfield, working
in Montreal, Canada. Through direct electrical stimulation of the cortex in fully conscious
patients, he and his colleagues have been reponsible for constructing remarkable "homuneulus
maps" of both the sensory and motor areas of the human brain.
By applying a threshold current to various excitable areas of the cerbral cortex, a variety
of responses folow which may be broadly categorized as motor,sensor}' and metal, pertaining
to the brain itself.12 For example, sometimes electrical stimulation of a sensoiy area results in
a basic sensation of seeing, hearing or feeling, depending on the site. Somatic sensations in¬
clude such subjective feelings as tingling or a sense of movement, visual responses include a
sense ofmoving lights, colors, or stars, whereas auditor}' phenomena may include a perception
of buzzing, whispering, singing or thumping sounds. Similarly, stimulation of motor areas
results in a wiggling of toes, fingers, a twitch of the mouth —even salivation, chewing, and
swallowing. To determine the exact order and relative extent of cortical areas that can be iden¬
tified in either the sensory or motor sequence, Penfield and Boldrey created vivid, graphic maps
that have come to be known as the sensory and motor homuneulus.13
Other neurologists have also contributed to our growing understanding of brain function
using allied but complementary means. For example, studies of brain lesions have been used to
locate regions associated with impaired abilities, enabling identification of areas for long-term
memory as opposed to short-term memory, as well as areas designated for number and melody.
Micro-structures and neuro-anntomy
While macro-structure anatomy of the sort perfected by Penfield and his colleagues has led to
increasingly refined understanding of the brain's topology, studies of the micro-structure of
neurons and neuro-anatomy have been equally significant. Here one of the major problems in
cortical histology has been the nature of the connections and interaction between an axon and
the cell to wich it discharges its impulses. At issue, in part, was whether they were actually con¬
nected or not. For example, Ramón y Cajal in the last paper he published discussed the matter
in some detail, conluding that "the dendritic spines are not connections between axon and den¬
drite... . Nevertheless, the fact remains that the axons approach the dendrites very closely".1'*
" Restak 1984, p. 27. The brain's growth and final form depend on brain cell multiplication, a process that
races on during the mine months before birth at about 250,000 new neurons per minute.
12 Clarke and Dewhurst 1972, p. 127. Of Penfield's voluminous writings the following have been used here:
Penfield and Boldrey 1937, pp. 389-443; Penfield and Rasmussen 1957; Penfield 1968, pp. 831-840; and Penfield
1958.
13 Penfield and Boldrey 1937, p. 432.
14 Ramón y Cajal 1934, p. 16.
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Remarkably, it was not until the 1960s that silver staining techniques succeed in revealing
the entire reticular formation of neurons. And as late as 1978 the neurologist Charles Needham
could still observe how remarkable it was that "knowledge ot the structural oiganization of the
thalamus... is virtually limited to the work of Ramón y Cajal (in 1900 and 1911 )."15
As for the actual "wiring" of the human brain suggested by the techniques pioneered by
Ramón y Cajal and Golgi, Needham explains:
The neurons of the human brain have inputs and outputs organized in parallel, in series,
and in circuits... The number of synaptic contacts between one neuron and other neurons in the
human brain is ordinarily between 1,000 to 10,000. As many as 30,000 synapses can occur in
a single reticular neuron. There are more than 10 billion neurons in the human cerebrum and
something on the order of 10-100 trillion synapses.16
If synaptic connections are conceived of as on/off gateways, where information is either
blocked or allowed to pass, this information may be represented digitally as either 0 (blocked)
or 1 (passed). From this point of view, there are obvious direct analogies with computer cir¬
cuitry. If one looks at an entry in the stored memory of an electronic computer, say:
00110100010110)1...,
this could represent, without additional information, numbers, letters, words, part of a musical
score, a graphic design, even a photograph or a simple Morse code. Indeed, with nothing more than
0 and 1, a binary code could represent any of these, and of course the possibilities are endless.
In addition to objects, binaty code can also convey instructions. Computers have been
programmed to write poetry, play chess, and administer psychotherapy.17 JOHNNIAC was
even designed to prove propositions of Russell and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica. The
extraordinary power of binary encoding also lies behind the structure of neural networks. As
Needham puts it:
If one examines the axonal output of an individual neuron, one also discovers a binary series of the
action potentials and intervening non-action potentials...
i.e. 001IOI0001011011....
In other words, either the axon fires an impulse capable of bridging a synapse, or it does
not. It either makes a connection (1) or it does not (0). Here the analogy between synapse net¬
works and the digital computer is direct.
Needham summarizes the significance of all this, neurologically, as follows:
The all-or-nothing behavoir of the inidividual neuron is the elemental unit of logic. All language are
reductible to logic. All mathematic is reductible to logic.... If quantifiable order or logic is the substrate
for both mathematics and language, what is die final substrate for logic itself? How is logic generated?
Logic has strictly biological origins. The rapid processing of information favors survival.
The opposite favors extinction... To say that all logic originates in living nervous systems is to
redefine logic. Original logic is always bio-logic.18
15 Needham 1978, p. 184.
16 Needham 1978, p. 191.
17 Weizenbaum 1976.
18 Needham 1978, p. 193.
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Neural networks, Needham stresses, are just like computers:
Any processor ofbinary logic can be regarded as a digital computer, and this is the output property of
the individual neuron. The stimulus or dendritic input to the neuron is the trigger which either depolar¬
ize the membrane potential to threshold and produces the axona! response of a single action potential
(I) or fails to sufficiently depolarize so that no action potencial occurs (0).19
But the brain Is not simply a digital device, an all-or-nothing zero-one processor, because
when an action potential arrives at an axon terminal, a "transmitter substance" is released,
noradrenaline or dopamine. Needham explains the further significance of this more subtle
aspect of neuro-chemistry:
The extent ofdendritic depolarization is proportional to the concentration of transmitter substance re¬
leased..., thereby transforming the impulse frequency (i.e. digital code) of the transmitting neuron into
the magnitude ofdepolarization (i.e. analog code) of the recipient neuron.20
Needham concludes as follows:
In summary', a digital computer deals with discontinuous quantities —it counts. An analog computer
deals with continuous quantities— it measures.21
In terms of neural structures and activity, this reduces to the fact that dendrites analogize, axons digi-
talize. In other words, "the neuron is not merely an on/off switch. Rather, the neuron is a complex ana¬
log/ digital computer transmitting ordered, or logical, intormation".22
Human logic, in many respects, is binary: yes/no, true/false, even/odd, high/low, all/none,
and/or, if/then, etc. All of these polarities are clearly well-suited to the binary character of
the neuron network. Nevertheless, there is only a limited extent to which analogies between the
human brain and artificial intelligence should be pushed. As Needham under-scores:
Neurological intelligence is originative, artificial intelligence is derivative. Neurological intelligence is
always alive, artificial intelligence is always dead.... One computer may program another, and may
even construct and repair and interpret another, but the original logical instructions, codes, languages
and programs are generated in living nervous systems.23
Furthermore:
Logic is a biological survival mechanism which accomplishes the internalization of the world. Logic
is the environment which confers meaning on the environment. The flux of all that is indeterminate,
random, and accidental in the external world is measured, counted, quanlitated (sic) and made deter¬
minate by the logical process of living nervous systems.24
Logic, of course, is essential to the ability to learn, another fundamental aspect of Intelli¬
gence. Colin Blakemorc emphasizes the Importance of the human capacity for learning as follows:
19 Needham 1978, p. 194.
20 Needham 1978, p. 195.
21 Needham 1978, p. 196.
22 Needham 1978, p. 196.
23 Needham 1978, p. 199.
24 Needham 1978, pp. 199-200.
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The emergence of the capacity to learn is the triumph of evolution... A primary requirement ofany ani¬
mal is that it should be able to anticipate changes in its environment. Inherited reflexes contain a sta¬
tic description of the events of high probability in the past experience of the species, but learning
allows each animal to add a stock of personal secrets to its description of the probabilities of the world.
To anticipate the future is the ultimate goal of the evolution of the nervous system.35
In turn, Blakemore relates this directly with language:
As with words, the structure of grammar reveals the machinery of the human mind... In his revolu¬
tionary theory of syntax, Noam Chomsky claimed that people have within them an innate, universal
system of syntax which makes them competent to learn to understand and to generate speech. This
knowledge is the prerequisite for any human language. It comprises the laws govern the formation of
elementary sentences; these "deep structures" are prepositional descriptions...36
Or, as Chomsky himself has explained:
The central doctrine ofCartesian linguistics is that the general features of grammatical structure are
common to all languages and reflect certain fundamental properties of the mind... The study of
the universal conditions that prescribe the form of any human language is "grammaire générale".
Such universal conditions are not learned; rather, they provide the organizing principles that make
language learning possible, that must exist if data is to lead to knowledge. By attributing such prin¬
ciples to the mind, as an innate property, it becomes possibles to account for the quite obvious fact
that the speaker of a language knows a great deal that he has not learned.37
At an even deeper level, however, what is "known" may be said to depend upon what
nerve cells communicate. Many animals, for example, have little or no sense of color. Others
can see into that are invisible to us. As Colin Blakemore puts it:
The brain gains its knowledge by a process analogous to the inductive reasoning of the classical scien¬
tific method. Neurons present arguments to the brain based on the specific features that detect, argu¬
ments on w hich the brain constructs its hypothesis of perception.38
Mathematics, logic and neuro-anatomy
Needham, who has been especially concerned with connections between mathematics, logic,
and neuroanatomy, begins with the premise that thoughts represent the formalization of factual
states of affairs. Pure mathematics and symbolic logic may be regarded as formal processes.
But the formal relations of mathematics also seem to be independent of actual objects, and
hence, in their formal sense, independent of sense perception. Even if our knowledge of them
is a priori rather a posteriori, in order to comunícate this mathematical knowledge, "common"
or familiar "conversational" language has developed chiefly as a means of communicating pos¬
sibilities. A "formal" language like symbolic logic, however, is meant to be much stricter, and
is expected to include all propositons, tautologies, and contradictions. Because of its rigidly for¬
mal nature, pure mathematics is inherently different from familiar "conversational" language.
There must, therefore, be a difference in the manner by which the nervous system repre¬
sents a priori information, the information of necessary fomialations, from the representation
35 Blakemore 1977, p. 116.
36 Blakemore 1977, pp. 133-34.
37 Chomsky 1966, p. 59-60.
38 Blakemore 1977, p. 91.
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of a posteriori information, that which arises from perceptual experience. Certain forms of
information, it then follows, must be built into nervous system without the direct, immediate
participation ofsense-experience. Such information is correspondingly formal. It is on the basis
of such information that we are able to conceive universals, for example, when we perceive
only individual particulars. In mathematics, we envision entire sets and classes although we
see only members. Somehow, we are able to "know" the infinite, even though we only confront
the finite in either the objective or subjective words of space and time, in the objects, events
and phenomena (both physical and mental) that we may consider.
Language versus computation
There are numerous instances, based on neurological case studies, in which computational
ability is disturbed whereas language comprehension is not. Because of the participation of
perceptual processes in propositional structures and the absence of perceptual mechanisms
in necessary structures, the neurological foundation for each must differ. What language and
mathematics have in common is logic. What distinguishes language from mathematics,
however, is neurological. Put briefly, the words or language used to communicate the things
or states to the external world must be represented differently in nervous systems from the
way in which numerical relationships between such things and states are handled neurolo¬
gical ly.
As Needham puts it, "Symbolization is neurological representation... The world is inter¬
nalized and formalized by the logic operative in nervous systems".29 The world, in other words,
is internalized and formalized by the logic operative in nervous systems.
Mathematical prodigies
Here the case of certain prodigies is instructive. The British neurologist Macdonald Critchley
has written extensively about higher corical functions and idiot savants. Prodigious calculators, he
concludes, actually use enhanced memory rather than mathematical skill. Of the many case
he has studied, most rely on extensive memorization of tables. These can be quickly recalled,
with the use ofmnemonics, and by using cross-multiplications and simple short cuts, the results
can be impressive. Several cases are of very special interest— one subject showed a clear pref¬
erence for working with multiples of 16; another was especially good at using powers of2. This
suggests that some idiot savants may rely on the hardwiring of the brain working on a binary
system or a base sixteen estension of a binary system that exploits the "all-or-nothing" pheno¬
menon of neuronal firing.
Here the binary character of neurons is essential; i.e. they either fire or they do not. There
may be multiple other neurons feeding input to the dendrites of a single neuron, but the firirng
neuron either fires or does not. As a result, the comparison with transitor and computer func¬
tion is in itself interesting. At present computers are strongest in their computational abilities.
Is it possible that in the absence of all the sensory clutter in the real world, without any inter¬
nal stimulations and distractions —in other words, if left to itself— the left parietal cortex
would be an excellent calculator. It is at least possible to consider a model of the brain that
works as a very complex multiprocessing binary computer. In such a model each neuron plays
the part of a complex processing computer, but gives only a single response. It either fires or it
29 Needham 1978, pp. 55-56.
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does not. A given neuron may link to thousands of other neurons; these in turn, depending on
multiple other possible inputs, either fire or do not.
Mathematics and the brain
It may be that the first and most basic concepts of mathematics begin with the recognition of
one's own identity as distinct from all other objects, which amounts to self-awareness. Self-
awareness may in turn be understood as a kind of recursive thinking. On this view, computers
may be said to be conscious in at least a very limited sense, but with only one or two addition¬
al levels of self-awareness, they could also be considered to be just as "conscious" as human
beings. For example, a disk operating system (DOS) is aware of typed input and responds
accordingly. When a computer is switched on, it first undertakes a series of internal checks to
make sure that its memory is functioning properly. This process may be taken as fist-order or
a very primitive level of self-awareness. If another level is added —a parallel— or sub-pro¬
cessor perhaps which monitors the disk operanting system or the internal checks it makes—
and if on this higher level the computer where asked what "it", i.e. the computer, was doing,
the computer would reply that "it" was either responding to DOS commands or making a series
of internal checks. Adding yet another level of self-awareness —video cameras perhaps, with
which the computer could view itself as distinct from other objects around it— imagine how
the computer would then respond if queried, now able to report where it was in its evironment
and what it was doing? Would this be consciousness?
Some argue that humans are not only aware of what they are doing, but are also aware
that they are aware, and that it is precisely this that makes us "conscious". On the other hand,
after a few layers of recursive awareness have been added, the level of actual self-awareness
becomes meaningless, that is, it makes no sense to say that "I am aware that I am aware that I
am aware that 1 am aware" is any more "aware" than some one or thing saying "... I am aware
that I am aware that I am aware that I am aware". Therefore, with only a few levels of recursi¬
ve awareness, the computer may well be said to be "self-aware", and perhaps just as much self-
aware as any human being.30
I will not consider any further here the question ofwhether computers may be self-aware
or not, but go to suggest that once a being is self aware, as with a computer recognizing itself
as different from the objects around it, then in turn it can begin to recognize other objects as
being separate and therefore "countable". From this self-realization —a sort of cogito ergo
sum— the concept of numbers arises. In this case, the number concept is a priori in the sense
that we cannot be aware of it unless we have self-consciousness first. The a priori nature of
numbers may well be related to the evolutionary history of the structure of the universe, made
up of conglomerates of atoms which by nature of the environmental separations around them
lend themselves to being seen as individual countable objects by our consciousness, leading
thereafter to higher and more complex structures.
The actual neuronal structure of the brain that account for counting is probably related to
the logic in the "chaotic" organization of neural netwoks in the brain. Recent neuro-anatoniical
research has shown that neuronal hardwiring in the brain actually follows chaotic patterns, that
is, although appearing to be random or chaotic, they actually follow fractal patterns according
30 For recent discussions of evolution, the brain and human intelligence, see Edelman 1987, Chalmers 1995.
Chalmers 1996, and Blodk, Flanagan and Gilzeldere 1996.
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to the rules of chaos which determine neuronal w iring. This hard wiring is influenced by sen¬
sory stimulation during the first two years of life; without it, with no stimulation during that
time, the hard wiring never develops. From then on, sensory stimulation affects the "weighting"
of neuronal connections between neurons in the neural networks, probably by a process known
as "long term potentiation".
All this means that the hard-wiring of the neurological networks in the brain, which
occurs during the first few years of life, are crucial. Part of the hard-wiring in the left parietal
cortex allows us to count based on a complex but essentially binary output neural network.
Subsequently, a simple memory system makes it possible to accomplish basic arithmetic. Idiot
savants simply make use of this capability to an unusually high degree.
With the capacity to count, mathematical abilities help to describe the real, external world.
This external reality presents itself as discreet objects which lend themselves to counting. The
leap from counting to the laws of physics may be formidable, but perhaps reasonable after all,
and undeniably effective as the history of science makes clear.
There is a remarkable symmetry between the quantum nature of physics, which in its most
reduced form involves countable particles which combine to make up the almost (and perhaps)
infinitely complex universe, just as neurons concatenate to form the almost infinite number of
neural connections within our own brains.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the integration of mind and body may all be referred back to the insights Descartes
offered on the essential connection between res cogitaos and res extensa. Even though
Descartes may have been wrong about the pineal gland serving as a king of biochemical cen¬
tral processing unit, he was nevertheless correct in the major outline he offered, suggesting that
our knowledge of the external world is ultimately and inextricably seated in the biology of the
brain.
Peirce, pragmatism, and evolution
Charles Sanders Peirce, the American Pragmatist, realized that both the laws of nature and the
structures of our brains -which find ever more ingenious ways of apprehending and interpret¬
ing nature's laws —w ere the products of evolution. This was ultimately the secret to the ans¬
wer Peirce gave to his question about why we so often guess right? How had he managed to
guess who had stolen his gold watch? Above all, why from all of the infinite possibilities is
science able to isolate the most relevant factors necessary to provide ever more accurate scien¬
tific theories?
The mind ofman has been formed under the action of the laws of nature, and therefore it is not so very
surprising to find that its constitution is such that, w hen we can get rid of caprices, idiosyncrasies, and
other perturbations, its thoughts naturally show a tendency to agree with the law s of nature.31
Hence, the mind is able to apprehend nature because it is itself a result of the forces and
relationships in nature that have been instrumental in its evolutionary construction at every
31 C.S. Peirce, "The Proper Treatment of Hypotheses (A Preliminary Chapter, Toward an Examination of
Hume's Argument Against Miracles, in its Logic and in its History), "Houghton MS CSP 692; and "flume's
Arguments Against Miracles, and the Idea of Natural Law", Houghton MS CSP 873, transcribed in Peirce 1985,
vol. 2, pp. 890-904, esp. p. 901.
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step. This is exactly what Noam Chomsky suggested in sayind that by the time evolution had
produced the brain of Homo Sapiens Sapiens, the modern human brain had been structured in
an apriori way as a result of that evolution, creating in the process a template with certain taxo¬
nòmic categories awaiting initialization.
Unfortunately, human knowledge is not apriori in the sense that we simply wake up one
day speaking Chinese —or solving differential equations. What is given, and a priori in this
sense, is the brain itself, its complex neural networks and its seemingly infinite potential to res¬
pond to successful learning accumulated over millennia. In the short term, the brain is con¬
stantly exploring new strategies leading to new models and possibilities for both investigating
and justifying new knowledge, apparently without limit.
With proper training in the early years of childhood, the brain is responsive to language
and to mathematics. In the absence of appropriate initial stimulation, however, those structures
apparently atrophy and it soon becomes impossible to establish neural pathways. On the other
hand, once in place, as the human brain begins to grow and develop, it eventually discovers the
unexpected, perhaps unreasonable effectiveness of those structures to provide models—of lan¬
guage, of mathematics, and of spatio-temporal relations in general.
As Descartes said, cogito, ergo sum, but without the ability to perceive oneself, and in
turn to distinguish the one from the many, the first steps towards numbering and the successive
hierarchy of mathematics from the discrete to the continuous, from the finite to the infinite,
would never have been taken, nor would they even have been possible.
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